tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post1273580051860527312..comments2024-03-27T08:33:11.834-07:00Comments on There is some truth in that: Fitting the EvidenceJonathan Jenkins Ichikawahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05260245860017778409noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-53419901556494349572011-08-30T14:25:28.000-07:002011-08-30T14:25:28.000-07:00Just saw this. I think the key to your puzzlement...Just saw this. I think the key to your puzzlement, Jonathan, is etiological. They never took it to be illuminating apart from a theory of evidence. They were just taken aback that people were fairly nonchalantly offering responsibilist cases which had pretty clear evidentialist answers, which struck them as much simpler. They are amazed that people found the thesis controversial. They've made pretty clear what they take their theory of evidence to be and the view that's supposed to be illuminating is the wider view, though they acknowledge that one wants a theory of epistemic support as well--which they also offer, and then they also would like to put it to work, in a theory of knowledge, which at least Rich does. The Rochester way is to really labor over the small stuff, the foundations, etc. We used to spend whole seminars on the opening words of an essay. Often, Earl would contemplate the title for some time. I persist in being amazed that people are still offering the same kinds of responsibilist cases as counter-examples to evidentialism. If you're really interested in the topic, I do have a suggestion... :-) http://bit.ly/qHMmQVTrent Doughertyhttp://www.TrentDougherty.infonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-87742206493647714742011-07-23T04:58:10.000-07:002011-07-23T04:58:10.000-07:00I don’t know much about philosophical discussions ...I don’t know much about philosophical discussions about evidence, but I suspect that there are some who think that Bayesian Confirmation Theory has been enormously helpful in increasing our understanding of evidence. According to some, whether or not E is evidence for hypothesis H is determined by whether or not P(H/E) > P(H). That requires some judgment as to the prior probability of H. Presumably our prior probability assignments to H must be justified. But they cannot be justified by the evidence in question (E, that is) precisely because we are dealing with prior probabilities. So I wonder how evidentialists would think about justification with respect to our subjective prior probability assignments.Lex Mentishttp://lexmentis.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-71168354742694606152011-07-23T06:27:29.000-07:002011-07-23T06:27:29.000-07:00Hi Jonathan,Agreed!There are lots of platitudinous...Hi Jonathan,<br>Agreed!<br>There are lots of platitudinous sounding claims about j and e that I find in their work and never do I find these claims terribly helpful. Still, I think they are probably false. For example, compare three claims: (a) you may believe what fits the evidence<br>(b) you must not believe without sufficient evidence<br>(c) you must not believe without sufficient reason<br>Of these three the last seems most obvious. I would argue that whether there is suff reason depends both on reasons to believe and reasons not to believe. If reasons-not do not supervene upon a subject's evidence, we can accept c and b while rejecting a. Take the view on which you shouldn't believe p if you cannot properly treat p as a reason for action or for belief. If p isn't properly included in deliberation, there is not sufficient reason to believe but the belief might fit the evidence. I take it that c and f either have to reject c or reject the idea that there are any epistemic norms of the sort I'm imagining that govern belief ( norms the satisfaction of which depend upon more than just relations of fit). Once this is clear, I think it is fair to ask why we should prefer their apparent platitude a to c.Claytonnoreply@blogger.com