tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post7613378560759539110..comments2024-03-27T08:33:11.834-07:00Comments on There is some truth in that: Varieties of Enabling ConditionsJonathan Jenkins Ichikawahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05260245860017778409noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-49518718945293515712010-02-10T08:07:17.000-08:002010-02-10T08:07:17.000-08:00Here is how I would describe the case. When you we...Here is how I would describe the case. When you went through the proof for the first time you didn't have knowledge because you had an undercutting defeater - something like: when I go through proofs of this degree of complexity, I am not reliable enough to acquire knowledge on this basis. By going through the proof once again, you defeat this defeater because, say, you know that going through a proof of this degree of complexity twice usually suffices for knowledge. So, the impression that "this looks like a merely enabling role for experience" probably arises because the experience involved when you go through the proof the second time just helps to defeat a defeater, which is - in some sense - not much of a positive epistemic achievement. Still, to help defeating a defeater is more than merely playing an enabling role - at least that's how it looks to me.Joachim Horvathhttp://johorvath.googlepages.com/homenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-58465678668340246922010-02-11T21:30:34.000-08:002010-02-11T21:30:34.000-08:00Joachim: two responses. First, it's not clear ...Joachim: two responses. First, it's not clear that the line you suggest is going to be sufficiently general. For there won't always, I think, be the relevant kind of empirical defeater; a special feature of the case that you rely on is that I know these facts about my reliability. But suppose I don't; for all I know, I never make logical or transcription errors. I think the worry still goes through. If in fact I'm not reliable enough, then I don't know until I check my proof, whether or not I had that empirical defeater.<br><br>Second, suppose you're right: the role for experience described is a empirical-defeater defeater. Isn't that just the kind of thing I'm talking about? It's not part of my evidence for believing C; my reasons for believing C don't include having double-checked the proof.Jonathannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5673382.post-86013473959026299142010-02-11T23:23:53.000-08:002010-02-11T23:23:53.000-08:00Jonathan,to your first point: it seems like you...Jonathan,<br><br>to your first point: it seems like you're going in a Burgean direction here, at least I vaguely remember Burge saying similar things (e.g. in "Content Preservation" or in his paper on the apriority of computer proofs). Anyway, it's not clear to me anymore why you actually need the complication with going through the proof for a second time. After all, when you go through it the first time, experience is already involved when you work out the steps of the proof on the blackboard - and it seems merely enabling here just as well, even though it is probably crucial for reaching the (correct) conclusion. In fact, what the experience & the blackboard are doing in your case seems exactly parallel to the merely preservative use of memory à la Burge.<br><br>To your second point: Suppose you're right that the experience involved in checking the proof is not part of my evidence for believing C. Doesn't that just show that there are other ways to play more than a merely enabling role than by being part of one's evidence? For, it just seems undeniable to me that either being a defeater or being a defeater-defeater is more than being something that's merely enabling. Maybe we could call a defeater a "preventing condition" and a defeater-defeater a "restoring condition", and then my claim would be that in your original case experience plays a merely restoring role - still something else than a merely enabling one...Joachim Horvathhttp://johorvath.googlepages.com/homenoreply@blogger.com