Wednesday, February 22, 2006
This is how you do no harm?
Ok, I just have to say, I really don't get this anesthesiologist California execution thing. I guess the issue is, California wants to execute this guy for horrible crimes, and they want to have anesthesiologists present to make sure he's not suffering unduly. Ok, so far, so good. (I'm not sure how comfortable I am with the death penalty in general, but we'll set that aside and assume that death can be an appropriate punishment from the state. And obviously, preventing undue suffering is a good thing.)
So they're all set to execute the guy the night before last, when the anesthesiologist are suddenly, like, "no, we're doctors, and we can't take part in this procedure, because we might be called upon to sedate the guy, which would in some sense sort of be like partly causing his death, and we've promised to first do no harm." And the medical community seems pretty much completely behind this decision.
It would be one thing if they were actively taking a stand against the death penalty. "We refuse to participate in this action because it's wrong to kill somebody, and we're lobbying to stop it altogether, and we're exercizign our position of control to prevent the state murder of this guy." If they said that, I'd understand. They're against the death penalty. But that's not what's going on here. They're not opposed to the death penalty in principle. They don't want to prevent the execution. They just don't want to play a role in it themselves -- even if that role could only have the effect of making the execution more humane.
This, I submit, is the doctrine of double effect gone insane. If the execution goes forward without the assurances of no undue suffering, then the conscientious objection of these anesthesiologists would have done a good deal of harm.
(Unfortunately, the NYT piece I link to doesn't have an in-depth discussion of the reasoning for the objection, or the official view of the anesthesiologist association, or anything like that; I take much of what I say here about the facts from the story I heard on All Things Considered last night. I don't have time to find a link to the appropriate information, sorry.)
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This is perhaps the story you listened to.
ReplyDeleteYes, I think that's right. (My computer doesn't like the link, unfortunately, so I can't check and make sure...)
ReplyDeleteThanks.
It sounds more like deontology than double effect. Or perhaps it's characterological. Either way, the doc thinks that there are some things that, as a doctor, he just shouldn't do. It reminds me of Williams' 'Jim and the Indians' case: what we do as individuals has a tremendous moral importance, beyond the mere consequences.
ReplyDeleteConsider a more extreme case: you're a doctor in a fascist dictatorship. The secret police ask you to supervise the torture sessions to make sure no body dies. Should you do it? Yes, your participation would save lives, but it would also at least tacitly condone the torture. Seems obvious to me that you should decline.
Imlac:
ReplyDeleteI don't think your 'more extreme case' is an apt analogy. It may be that you should decline in that case because to participate would be to participate in a terrible act. If you think that the death penalty is a similarly terrible act, ok -- like I said, conscientious objection to the death penalty strikes me as perfectly understandable. What I don't understand is saying "no, we refuse to participate in this (even to make things better), but we're not opposed to it in principle."
Jen:
I wonder how far you're willing to carry that reasoning. Suppose that instead of lethal injection, the State of California wanted to execute criminals by beating them to death with hockey sticks. One might argue: this criminal raped and tortured women; his crimes involved far more cruelty than merely being beaten to death, so it's ok to inflict this punishment. Maybe you think that, but that's pretty extreme, and I'm pretty sure that'd definitely fall under 'cruel and unusual'.
I would agree that it's not double effect. Double effect is when you think it's ok to do what would othrwise be wrongful harm but it's ok because you don't intend the harm itself and don't intend the harm to be a means to an end. This isn't justifying a harm. It's not wanting to do it yourself. That's just moral cowardice. If they believe the killing is just, then they should be willing to do it.
ReplyDeleteJeremey and Garrett, you are right -- I was mistaken to describe this as a double effect case. Double effect is about the intent, not about who is involved.
ReplyDeleteYou're right the analogy wasn't apt. Let me try again.
ReplyDeleteAs a teacher you have some professional obligations that a non-teacher doesn't. If, say, your chair told you to do something that violated your professional obligations, but that is not itself immoral in general for a non-teacher. I can't think of a concrete example off the top of my head, but it doesn't seem inconceiveable.
I think an examination of the professional obligations is in order. The only real professional oath that you hear docs spewing about is "first do no harm". This does not say first do not condone state ordered death penalty (regardless of its morality). The most effective way for the docs to do no harm is to make sure they prevent suffering during execution of the death order. They will not be doing the harm as sodium barbitol will do that end. They can prevent any uneccessary and certainly unmoral suffering. If the docs as johnathan says, are opposed to the death sentence they should not have agreed to stand by the execution.
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