How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Kripke-Putnam considerations suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is possible and what we can coherently imagine.
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge, with Benjamin Jarvis. Forthcoming in Nous.
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[...] Our book is tentatively titled Rational Thinking: Philosophical and Quotidian. It offers a theory of mental content, a characterization of the relation between rationality and apriority, and a treatment of philosophical methodology. It is descended in fairly direct ways from the work we’ve done in our two previous co-authored papers, here and here. [...]
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