About Philosophical Buzzwords posts.
Todd asked for a definition of a sorites argument. I know what a sorites argument is, but I'm not entirely sure I can give an uncontroversial account. But I'll try. Luckily, I have a candidate handy, from my paper on
the sorites paradox and the aggregation of harms.
The following argument is prototypically a sorites paradox:
1. A single grain of wheat is not a heap.
2. For any number n, if n grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are n+1 grains.
3. Therefore, there is no number n such that n grains is enough to make a heap.
An alternative formulation which would also count as a sorites paradox is this:
1. A single grain of wheat is not a heap.
2.1. If 1 grain of wheat is not a heap, then neither is 2 grains.
2.2. If 2 grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are 3 grains.
...
2.999999. If 999,999 grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are 1,000,000.
3. Therefore, by a million applications of modus ponens, 1,000,000 grains are not a heap.
What's notable is that the arguments appear valid, each premise is intuitively true, and the conclusion is intuitively false.
I think this might be a good formal definition of a sorites:
An argument is soritical if and only if it meets all of the following conditions:- it is of this form, where F is the soritical predicate (‘is not a heap’, for instance):
Fa1
If Fa1 then Fa2
If Fa2 then Fa3
…
If Fai-1 then Fai
Therefore,
Fai (where i can be arbitrarily large)
- {a1, ... ai} is initially ordered, with each adjacent pair indiscriminable with respect to F.
- Fa1 is intuitively true.
- Fai is intuitively false.
I think that a formulation very much like this might come from Barnes.
No comments:
Post a Comment